Agent-Causation and Paradigms for God’s Knowledge by Schneider, Christina
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIloSoPHY oF relIGIoN 5/1 (SPrING 2013), PP. 35-54
AGENT-CAUSATION AND PARADIGMS FOR GOD’S 
KNOWLEDGE
CHRISTINA SCHNEIDER
Ludwig Maximilian University Munich
Abstract. The article aims at formulating a philosophical framework and by this 
giving some means at hand to save human libertarian freedom (due to ‘agent-
causation’), God’s omniscience (viz.: three paradigms of God’s knowledge) and 
God’s ‘eternity’. This threefold aim is achieved by 1) conceiving of an agent 
as having different possibilities to act, 2) regarding God’s knowledge – with 
respect to agents – not only as being ‘propositional’ in character but also as 
being ‘experiential’: God knows an agent also from the ‘first person perspective’, 
as the agent knows herself, and, 3), formulating ‘eternity’ and ‘temporality’ as 
being homeomorphically related to each other. This gives rise to a  coherent 
interplay that saves both human libertarian freedom and God’s omniscient 
‘view from eternity’.
Agent-causation, and, associated with it, libertarian freedom give rise 
to several coherence problems. As it seems, the most important one is 
agent-causation and libertarian freedom embedded in an otherwise 
‘scientifically’ understood universe. Within a physicalistic or materialist 
framework, the problem is not ‘resolvable’. Taking a  non physicalistic 
stance towards ‘mental states’ or ‘persons’, however, gives means at hands 
to resolve the coherence problem. The present article is not about this 
problem. It can be overcome as the author has shown elsewhere. rather, 
the resolution of this problem is presupposed in the present article. 
From a  technical point of view, some models formulated to overcome 
this problem are used and explicated here. To keep the presentation tight 
and simple, mathematical details that may be found at other places are 
largely avoided. Instead, the presentation in this article avails itself of 
commented pictures.
There is another, much older, coherence problem with libertarian 
human freedom and so with agent-causation: the relation of God, of His 
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omniscience, to human (libertarian) freedom, and, a fortiori, to agent-
causation. Albeit this problem naturally does not present itself within 
a ‘physicalist’ framework, it is a serious one.
Attempted solutions to this problem tend to have important 
consequences of how to conceive of God, His ‘temporality’ or ‘eternity’, His 
goodness, His power, His relation to His creation, His independence of 
His creatures, His ‘transcendence’, His own freedom, and so on. Attempted 
solutions may also affect the notion of human freedom itself, as different 
compatibilist solutions demonstrate. leibniz’ solution, presumably, is one 
of the historically most famous ones, and it is a  ‘compatibilist solution’. 
The molinist solution is not compatibilist in spirit. Instead, it tries to 
reconcile God’s omniscience and libertarian human freedom. Therefore, 
it serves in the present article as a starting point.
The present article does not attempt to resolve the problem of agent-
causation, freedom and God’s omniscience. This would presuppose 
a  refined theory of God and His relation to His creation, not least to 
clarifying what ‘creation’ means. It attempts only to indicate a species of 
knowledge that is both important for God’s knowledge of free human 
acts and somehow overlooked in the contemporary debate – at least, 
it is not taken as seriously as it deserves. In a slightly different context, 
however, this kind of knowledge is taken seriously, see, e.g. o’Dea 
(2002), Perry (2001) and Schärtl (2012). Taking care of this species 
of knowledge may contribute to conciliating God’s omniscience with 
libertarian human freedom.
The title of the paper uses the word ‘knowledge’. A  Gettier-style 
‘definition’ of knowledge as ‘true, justified belief ’ is clearly not adequate 
for God. He has no ‘beliefs’ – pace open theists of sorts – nor has He to 
‘justify’ anything and what He ‘thinks’ is ‘true’, simpliciter. Instead of one 
or another ‘definition’ of knowledge, the article exploits only paradigms 
of knowledge.
The article has five sections. The first sets the stage for the reflections 
to follow. The second section is about the aforementioned important 
paradigm of knowledge. The third formulates the relevant features 
of individuals as agents. The fourth section addresses the question 
whether this formulation avoids determinism and lawlikeness even in 
situations of deliberation. Avoiding this, is a criterion of adequacy. These 
considerations take up again the three paradigms for God’s knowledge 
and serve as a  criterion for the viability of the proposals concerning 
agent-causation made so far.
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The present article takes – at least provisionally – a definite stance 
towards the ‘temporality’ or ‘eternity’ of God. It favours ‘eternity’, in 
contrast to authors as e.g. Hasker (1989), Sanders (1998), boyd (2000), 
and rhoda (2011). but it does not argue the issue. rather, to serve as 
a second criterion for the adequacy of the proposals made in this article – 
especially those concerning the differences of God’s ways of ‘knowing’ – it 
formulates a model that combines God’s view from eternity on enfolding 
or acting individuals with respect to temporal order. This is the content 
of the fifth section. Whether this model implies either solutions or 
problems with respect to the relevant ‘attributes of God’ of one or the 
other sort, may be a topic of further investigation.
I. A molINIST CANVAS
In recent years, philosophers of the analytic tradition formulate molina’s 
theory of middle knowledge within the framework of counterfactual 
conditionals, for a detailed account, see the article of G. brüntrup und r. 
Schneider (2011). The formulation is semi-formally as follows:
(1) God knows for each circumstance – C say – how an individual, P, 
would act, A, if it finds itself in circumstance C.
(2) God ‘creates’ circumstance C.
(3) P does A.
(4) And, consequently, God knows it.
As it stands, this does not look as if the individual P acts freely. It is 
God who has the choice among different possibilities (different 
circumstances) C. but, given C, the individual does not seem to have 
alternatives to act. Some authors do not write simply ‘God knows for 
each circumstance – C – how an individual, P, would act’ but ‘God knows 
for each circumstance, C, how an individual, P, would freely act’. If ‘freely’ 
should be more than philosophical foot-stamping, the individual itself, 
must be given different possibilities to act for each circumstance C, at 
least. This, however, has consequences with respect to the paradigm 
under which we conceive of God’s ‘knowing’.
The molinist ‘solution’ is much like the deterministic paradigm of 
differential equations together with initial conditions. Together they 
determine uniquely each state of the ‘universe’, determine uniquely whole 
histories. God sets the initial condition, the rest follows. one may call 
this conception of a relevant individual a leibnizean complete concept.
38 CHrISTINA SCHNeIDer
In this circumstance, the paradigm of God’s way of knowing, is 
somehow like solving differential equations or at least like logical 
inferences. of course, God must not do that step by step, God ‘grasps’ 
infallibly the respective relations ‘at once’. metaphors pointing at 
intellectual activities seem more appropriate than those pointing at 
sensual activities – as ‘seeing’. The paradigm of knowledge in this 
circumstance can be called ‘inferential intuition paradigm’. This sounds 
much like a red herring, but it should indicate the paradigm of (logical) 
inference on the one hand and that it does not ‘take any time’ of sorts 
(‘intuition’). This situation, if no other species of ‘knowing’ is relevant 
for God’s omniscience, hosts problems for human freedom: there is 
none. but it displays no problems for the attributes one tends to assign to 
God: omniscience, a-temporality or ‘eternity’, immutability. Further, in 
principle, humans could do the same, they are only restricted in grasping 
which initial condition is the case, in grasping the complete history; they 
could be erroneous in their inferences – and all this takes time.
The situation changes if for each of the different conditions, 
individuals have different possibilities to perform, i.e. different possible 
histories they may somehow realize: each condition initiates a myriad 
of branching possible histories an individual may undergo. The ensuing 
possible histories do not merge, two different initial conditions may 
not lead to a  common possible episode of their ensuing possible 
histories. This situation – what initial condition leads to which myriad 
of branching possible histories – God can know by inferential intuition. 
but, if He creates a condition C*, the individual has different possible 
histories to undergo and it undergoes one and only one thereof. If God 
knows – and He does by omniscience – which of the possible histories 
ensues, then the paradigm of inferential intuition, is not appropriate. In 
this case, the metaphor of ‘seeing’ seems to be appropriate, as leftow 
(1991) argues in his book. The paradigm of knowing the difference of 
actual and merely possible histories may be called, albeit it is not a fine 
word, ‘observational intuition paradigm’. In this situation, an individual 
has different ontological possibilities, one of these will be ‘actualized’. one 
may call this conception of a relevant individual a possibilistic complete 
concept (cf. brüntrup and Schneider 2011) This way of ‘knowing’, in 
principle, is also open to humans: of course, they are restricted in what 
they may ‘see’, restricted in their empirical access and scope, they may 
interpret their ‘seeings’ wrongly, they may be deceived by their senses, 
and they are prone to diverse empirical fallacies – and all this takes time.
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Is this enough for human freedom? Do these two versions of 
knowledge exhaust the relevant paradigms?
II. eXPerIeNCe?
both paradigms, inferential intuition and observational intuition, are 
anthropocentric in the aforementioned sense. of course, as paradigms, 
they are necessarily bound to a human framework, that is not avoidable. 
but they are so in a fallacious way: They conceive of God’s knowledge 
of human actions as an external affair – God as an external ‘observer’, 
as will become clearer soon. God somehow knows of human actions 
in principally the same way as do other humans – only ‘infinitely more 
perfect’ and ‘a-temporally’. both paradigms point to what often is called 
‘propositional knowledge’. If they are used with the tacit assumption that 
what is known by God under the paradigm of inferential intuition or 
observational intuition or both is all there is to be known – even for an 
omniscient God – then one conceives of individuals as a leibnizean or 
a possibilist complete concepts.
of course, the ‘observational version’ raises problems, problems that 
are disputed: Given the assumption that God has knowledge by inferential 
intuition of all possible histories an individual may undergo and, given 
the further assumption that one and only one history is ‘actualized’ and 
that only ‘created’ things may become ‘actual’, then there are problems 
concerning the temporality of God, the immutability of God (Does He 
learn something ‘new’, when an individual’s history proceeds as it does?), 
the ‘causal’ relationship between God and its creatures – if there is any 
– and so on.
What seems hardly (but, see the short remark above) to be questioned 
is conceiving of God’s knowledge as propositional knowledge, as it is 
indicated by the paradigms above. but, a remark of Thomas reid’s is worth 
being remembered (reid 1788, from, Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 
1998: 226) in the present context:
From the consciousness of our own activity, seems to be derived, not 
only the clearest, but the only conception we can form of activity, or the 
exertion of active power.
This quotation concerning agent causation is not only a very short 
argument for assuming something like that, it hints to a more general 
feature of conscious beings of which ‘consciousness of activity’ or of 
‘acting’ are only cases. The famous dictum/question of Thomas Nagel 
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‘What it is like to be a bat?’ hints more explicitly to this feature: There are 
experiences of human beings that are authentically and fully transparent 
to no other human being except to that human being who has it. This 
does not hold only for the awareness of acting ‘now’, but also for other 
experiences – qualia are points in case.
This is not new but of importance concerning the exhaustiveness of 
the two paradigms of knowing. If there are other non-zombies than the 
author of this article, then there is more to be known about them than 
propositional knowledge – as being propositional – can grasp. This kind 
of knowledge may be called experiential and it is knowledge that may be 
had only by the individual itself of itself. If God is omniscient with respect 
to its creation, then He must have authentic knowledge of the different 
‘what-it-is-like-to-be  ... -nesses’ of His creatures – as far as they have 
them. This paradigm of knowledge may be called experiential paradigm.1
of course, this paradigm of knowledge is not restricted to the 
experience or consciousness of an individual’s ‘acting now’, this 
experience, however, is related to agent-causation and freedom. If this 
paradigm of knowledge should be relevant for agent-causation and 
freedom, individuals that may act in the strong sense of agent-causation 
must be formulated in contrast to individuals as complete concepts, 
leibnizean or possibilist.
III. INDIVIDuAlS AS AGeNTS
As mentioned above, the problem of agent-causation is foremost 
regarded as a problem concerning the coherence of what might be called 
the ‘inner life’ of an individual, or as lowe (e.g. lowe 1999: 8) would 
say, the ‘self ’ and its environment that may be called ‘physical’. Given an 
appropriate model of a ‘self ’ and its environment, the coherence problem 
may be overcome, as has been argued elsewhere. Crucial for the model 
is, among other things, that a ‘self ’ or the ‘inner life’ of an individual is 
regarded as the coordinated ‘bundle’ of all its possible histories, one and 
only one of which will be actualized or brought about by the individual 
during its ‘lifetime’. In this regard, it fits well to the present problem.
1 To avoid tedious formulations, instead of speaking about ‘God’s knowledge under the 
paradigm of inferential intuition, of observational intuition, of experiential knowledge’ 
the phrases ‘inferential knowledge’, ‘observational knowledge’ and ‘experiential 
knowledge’, respectively, are used.
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3.1 Modelling Agents
Depicting the model for one individual, one ends up with a figure like 
the following:
Figure 1
In what respect may it shield from the ‘solving differential equations 
paradigm’? In what respect does it express the act, the bringing about of 
the individual?2
Figure 1 above shows a ‘bundle’ of lines, depicting different possible 
histories of one individual. These bundles, however, are interrupted at 
a point, marked a on the x-axis, and the lines on the left side and the 
right side of this point display, at least visually, discontinuity.
The actual history, depicted boldly in the figure, displays discontinuity 
of sorts. If one zooms in this figure, one arrives at figure 2:
 a
Figure 2
2 It should be remarked that the model and the figure may be modified as to cope 
with ‘branching histories’ also, but this would complicate matters too much and is not 
important for the present task.
Figure 1
x
y
a
2
Figure 2
a
3
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Here, one sees an exaggeratedly depicted gap on the horizontal axis 
(henceforth also called x-axis) and three ‘continuous’ lines on the left 
side of the gap and three on the right side. The middle lines on both 
sides of the gap seem to be joinable in a ‘continuous’ manner. The other 
lines do not. Concerning the ‘discontinuous’ lines, this means that at the 
gap an act takes place. The gap indicates a possible act. Concerning the 
middle lines that may be joined continuously, this is to be interpreted 
that it is also possible that no act may take place at this locus, better: the 
individual refrains somehow actively from acting.
most important, however, is the – exaggeratedly depicted – gap on the 
x-axis separating the right curved lines from left ones. It symbolizes the 
act. Interpreting the x-axis as ‘time’, then, at the gap – symbolizing the 
act – the ‘flow of time’ is interrupted. That means an act has ‘no time’, is 
not an instant of time, nor is it ‘at’ a time. but it is related to ‘time’ as there 
is ‘time’ before the gap and after the gap; but there is neither a ‘last instant 
of time’ before the act nor a  ‘first instant’ afterwards. mathematically 
speaking, unduly coarse grained, the phases ‘before’ and ‘after’ the act are 
open (and also closed) sets. In themselves, they are depicted continuously 
and uninterrupted, symbolizing that in these phases no acts take place. 
This means that an individual is not and can not be acting ‘all the time’.
3.2 Three paradigms – again
With respect to the three paradigms of knowledge, three situations, due 
to acting, can be distinguished. The picture above shows no bold lines but 
a gap. To ‘know’ only this, God’s inferential intuition would be sufficient. 
According to that paradigm of knowledge, He may know what histories 
are possible and ‘where’ the individual may act. The next figure 3, with 
bold lines on both sides of the gap, indicates that the individual has been 
actual at the bold line on the left side of the gap and ‘brings about’ by 
acting its continuation on the right side of the gap:
 a
Figure 3
Figure 3
a
4
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This situation, taking care of the bold lines, is knowable, both, on the line 
of observational intuition, focussing only on what is going on ‘before’ and 
‘after’ the gap. To know that there is a gap, that is that past and future are 
conjoined by an individual’s act or by its refraining from acting and not 
by a simple performance, is known by inferential intuition. Knowledge, 
however, of the individual’s deliberation process – its intellectual as well 
as its experiential and emotional aspect – e.g., or knowledge of whether 
the act was set due to deliberation or due to pure spontaneity, say, is 
experiential knowledge. This can be had only by the acting individual 
itself and, due to His omniscience, by God. In this sense, God has a sort 
of knowledge that is not available to humans other than the acting one in 
a principle way. Humans do not ‘know’ ‘what it is like to be a bat’ or what 
‘it is like to be another individual’. Experiential knowledge is not grasped 
by the figure above.
3.3 What is to Swallow?
Depicting the possible histories of individuals as lines, i.e. as one dimen-
sional, reduces, of course, individuals to their possible and actual inner 
lives. This is enough for the present purpose, since acting with respect to 
an otherwise ‘physical’ environment is not dealt with in this article.
The possible inner lives are to be interpreted as individuated partly by 
the different possibilities the environment or – holistically – the universe 
may realize. They are, partly, the ‘psychic’ reactions to the different 
possible environments an individual may find itself in. The other part, 
the way the individual may react on different environments – differing 
from individual to individual, even if, strictly speaking impossible, 
situated in the same environment – belongs to the individual itself. That 
means, 1) the universe is conceived of as a ‘bundle’ of possibilities and 2) 
the inner life of an individual is conceived of as a bundle of possibilities, 
due to the different environments the individual may find itself in as well 
as to its internal ‘psychic’ possibilities to react. one may interpret this 
that each possible environment co-individuates ‘psychic’ possibilities of 
an individual.
The individual is able to act at certain ‘instances’. Acting can only ensue 
from an actual phase. each act ends up in actualizing both, a possible 
environment the individual ‘wants’ to find itself in in the near future and 
the actualization of its ‘psychic’ possibilities to react on it internally. The 
‘continuous’ phases between two possible acts may be interpreted as an 
individual’s ‘passive’ internal responsiveness to its environment.
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Concerning actual inner lives – the bold lines – these are meant to 
include anything that is relevant for experience, may the source of it be 
internal or external, may it be ‘memory’ of its own then actual past – 
as ‘memory’ – or thoughts. For a finite human individual, experiential 
knowledge presupposes a minimum of actual awareness of its inner live, 
albeit unconscious traces of its then actual past and its environment may 
contribute to the ‘shade’ of experiences.
Since God is omniscient, His experiential knowledge of His creature’s 
experiences are experientially fully transparent to Him – He has full 
experiential knowledge of it. He not only ‘experiences’ what the individual 
experiences but also any trace that is relevant for an individual’s way 
or ‘shade’ of experiencing, may it be conscious or unconscious to it. 
especially, each experiential knowledge includes experiential knowledge 
of each past experience of an individual in full transparency.
IV. FreeDom – DelIberATIoN – DeTermINISm AND ‘lAW’
If this model should be viable, the next question is, why should this way 
of conceiving of an individual as an agent save the libertarian freedom 
of the individual. In what way does it ban the ‘solving differential 
equation paradigm’ or the ‘chancy propagation paradigm’? This is the 
first criterion. The focus will be on ‘determinism’.
Famously, van Inwagen once argued that libertarian freedom is 
inconsistent with both a deterministic universe and an indeterministic 
one (Van Inwagen 1998, 2002): his consequence argument and his 
argument from repeated individual histories. Albeit the second 
argument is flawed on technical reasons, both point at serious problems 
for libertarian freedom. If the world would be deterministic, humans 
would be like puppets on a string, if the world would be indeterministic, 
humans would be like gambling machines of sorts.
The problem with determinism is that there is no libertarian 
freedom, as it is with indeterminism. The problem with indeterminism 
shows up when putatively free acts are taken to ensue from rational 
deliberation. In this case, the argument runs roughly as follows: even if 
the relevant individual is faced with different ‘ontological’ possibilities, 
a  rationally well-deliberated decision aims at a  unique situation. This 
situation ‘is brought about’ by the ensuing action (presupposing that it 
is successful as it was planned and wished by the relevant individual) is 
a consequence not only from the external circumstances an individual 
finds itself in, but also from his desires, beliefs, experiences, ‘memories’, 
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may they be conscious or not. It is uniquely determined by the history 
of the individual (its internal as well as its public aspects ‘before’ the act) 
and therefore, a rationally and fully deliberated action is a deterministic 
event of sorts.3
In his book Time and Eternity, brian leftow tries to demonstrate by 
examples, that even if
for all agents S and acts A, even if S does A freely, any agent qualitatively 
identical with S would do A in a situation qualitatively identical with S’s 
(leftow 1991: 257)
the agent A  is free in that he may have had different alternatives for 
acting. Whether this should hold for any agent and any situation, may 
be disputed. It should, however, hold, if the act is fully rational and 
deliberated. In this case, the whole deliberation process belongs to S, and 
so does the final decision.
If this intuition should be correct, then a  difference between the 
lewisian counterfactual situation and the situation described by leftow 
must be clarified. The leftownian counterfactual version is associated 
with the paradigm of ‘solving differential equations’. This is the paradigm 
for lawlike deterministic dependencies. The task for resolving the 
problem of freedom and deliberation therefore is to formulate the 
difference between ‘uniqueness’ and ‘lawlikeness’. ‘lawlikeness’ generally 
is assumed to come in two versions: deterministic and indeterministic 
lawlikeness. both are in conflict with freedom and deliberation.
So, as indicated above, the question and problem of determinateness of 
decisions, of rationally fully deliberated decisions, and ensuing acts dwells 
on the often felt conflict of ‘freedom and control’. Is rational deliberation 
a  case of problematic determination, leading to determinism? If this 
would be the case, then the individual’s act was not ‘up to it’ – some sort 
of ‘internal law’ would simply unfold – as the citation of leftow’s above 
indicates. The individual would be like a complete concept of sorts. An 
adequate model of agent-causation must avoid this.4
The case of unique determinateness by deliberation is a problematic 
one: being uniquely determinate by deliberation is in itself not a vice – it 
is a sign of rationality. but, what does distinguish this unique and definite 
3 D. lewis may be one of the most prominent adherents of this line of thinking 
(lewis 1986: 2-8). Compare also the short analysis of leftow (1991: 258) concerning the 
inter-definability of the counterfactual conditional ‘might’ and ‘would’, as proposed by 
lewis. A more comprehensive overview may be found in Fisher and ravizza (1998), and 
Widerker and mcKenna (2003).
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decision from a ‘lawful propagation’, conceived of as a ‘deterministic law’, 
prone to the ‘solving differential equations paradigm’?4
‘lawful’ determination is far stronger than uniqueness of a decision 
to act: At least in deterministic situations, ‘lawful determination’ implies 
uniqueness, but not vice versa. What does distinguish ‘lawful unique 
determination’ from uniqueness by deliberation?
There are two important paradigms of ‘lawfulness’ in ‘deterministic’ 
contexts: on the one hand, as mentioned above, the paradigm of ‘initial 
conditions, together with laws lead to a  unique future state’. on the 
other hand, the paradigm of ‘unfolding somehow like an algorithm’, like 
a computer-program that is executed and exercises a step-by-step ‘law of 
propagation’. The first is at stake here.
The core of lawlike propagation, even with respect to rather liberal 
assumptions, may be dubbed as ‘all in one and always the same principle’. 
A propagation is ‘deterministically lawlike’ if there is one ‘function’ that 
ties at once all ‘instances’ or ‘states’ and ‘times’ together. This ‘function’ 
expresses the law of propagation (in leibnizean terms: it expresses the 
complete concept of the individual in question). Formalizing this, leads 
to something as follows (leaving mathematical detail to one side):
 – let S be the set of ‘possible states of an individual’ and T or Ɍ ‘time’.
 – let Φ be a  function Ɍ × S mapping the pairs (t,s) (an instant of 
times, t, and a state, s,) to a (further) state s*, Φ(t,s) = s*. Φ is the 
law of propagation. It expresses what state will be reached or has 
been the case an interval of time of length |t| before or after a state s. 
Further:
Φ : Ɍ × S → S
with Φ(0,s) = s (to be interpreted as ‘being in state’ s)
and Φ(t+r, s) = Φ(r,Φ(t,s)) (this is the ‘law of propagation’; it means, e.g., 
that starting in a state s, going, first t ‘times’ ahead, reaching a state s’’, 
4 The other variant is that there are several possibilities to act, none of which is 
definitely chosen – on whatever reasons – by the individual’s deliberation. Nevertheless, 
the individual acts in one of the loosely reflected possible ways and, of course, there is 
only one actuality to show up. In this case, the individual’s acting has something ‘chancy’. 
but this is not a major problem. This situation may well be interpreted as being partly 
chanceful and of minor rationality. If this situation should be ‘stochastically lawful’, 
however, the individual’s propagation, its historical way, must then be conceived of as 
a stochastic process of sorts. The individual would then be like something that may be 
called ‘stochastic’ complete concept. This too, must be avoided by an adequate model of 
agent-causation.
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say, and then, starting in s’’, going r ‘times’ ahead, ending in state s*, 
say, is the same as starting in s and going s+r ‘times’ ‘at once’ ahead).
With this, the following holds:
(∃t∈T Φ(t, s) = Φ(t, s’)) ⇒ s = s’
If there is a time t and states s and s’ with Φ(t,s) = Φ(t,s’), then s= s’.
This clause reflects that the law of propagation is ‘deterministic’’ – no 
branching takes place. The graph of the function Φ(t,s) (t as variable, 
s fixed)
{Φs : Ɍ → S, Φs (t) = Φ (t, s)}
corresponds to a possible history. Different possible histories do not 
intersect and are complete concepts of individuals.
This way of modelling reveals the ‘all in one and always the same 
principle’ relevant for ‘lawlikeness’ – expressed by the function Φ.
In the model presented here, the core of an act is a ‘rupture’ of sorts, 
a  gap, with respect to its ‘past’ and, due to topological assumptions, 
the acts do not happen at ‘instants of time’. Therefore, this paradigm is 
explicitly avoided by the present attempt. moreover, there is nothing 
in the model that prevents two exactly equal phases of an individual’s 
histories during the phase ‘just before’ the act is set, to be ‘un-smoothly’ 
continued by two different phases. In both cases, however, the respective 
choices are unique.5
So, the paradigm of ‘lawful deterministic propagation’ as exploited 
here, includes very strong further assumptions. If incorporated, it would 
lead to other models of an individual’s ‘inner life’ – models that would 
depict intuitions that are hostile to agent-causality and to freedom. 
moreover, anything to be ‘known’ in principle of an individual would be 
a public affair, propositional knowledge would be enough. In the end, 
this means, individuals are conceived of as zombies.
moreover, if the histories of individuals proceed lawlike in the above 
formulated deterministic way, the only paradigm of knowledge relevant 
for God’s knowledge is inferential intuition. He simply must know Φ and 
the condition He creates – C. This is a Molinism of sorts.
5 Albeit not discussed presently, it should be noted that the algorithmic version is 
not reflected by the model presented in this article either, due to the circumstance that 
time is topologically not discrete. It would be a discrete version of sorts of the ‘all in one 
and always the same principle’ as proposed in the preceding paragraph. It also would be 
a rather strong further assumption that could only be captured by a strong modification 
of the model of agent-causation and freedom.
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The model as presented here, faces each individual in its phase ‘before’ 
the relevant act with different possibilities to act for. So, if deterministic 
lawlikeness is blocked by the ‘gaps’, the question remains, due to the 
different possibilities open to the individual, whether its acting history 
is somehow indeterministically or stochastically lawlike. The ‘somehow’ 
refers to the assumption that each act and each aim to be acted for is 
uniquely chosen by deliberation, and so, the probabilities playing a role 
in indeterministic or stochastic lawlikeness may be degenerate, i.e.: they 
may have only the values 1 and 0. And so, one may wonder whether by 
imposing degenerate probabilities to express the acting uniquely for an 
aim at each ‘gap’ lawlikeness is smuggled in. This is not the case. To keep 
the presentation technically simple, the mathematics relevant for seeing 
this are not discussed in this contribution.
V. THe VIeW From eTerNITY
Having considered so far the difference lawlike behaviour makes with 
respect to simple definite deliberation, this difference should be applied 
to ‘God’s view from eternity’. In the preceding section, the difference it 
makes to the paradigms of knowledge was only hinted at. As will be seen, 
this difference may be made more explicit. This difference has to do with 
‘temporality’ and ‘eternity’.
In advance, however, briefly mentioning the following, more serious 
problem is necessary: How to formulate or depict what experiential 
knowledge is about? or, how to formulate or depict what is ‘going on 
inside’ the acting individual. As noted above, figure 3 does not depict 
this. And it is not to be depicted somehow, since it is transparent only 
to God and the relevant individual, not to other human individuals. In 
short: It is not public. Therefore it can not be formulated or depicted 
in the public mode. Fortunately, the consequences of this species of 
‘knowable’ and knowledge, especially with respect to temporality and 
lawlikeness, may be formulated or depicted in a public way, and so, the 
assumption that the experiences of an individual are in need of a third 
sort of knowledge on the side of God, and that this sort of knowledge 
makes a difference that may be qualified.
The following is inspired by the work of leftow (1991) and Kretzman 
and Stump (1992) in that it takes up the intuition that what is going 
on in temporal order within the ‘created world’ is somehow eternally 
or a-temporally ‘present’ in ‘eternity’, without losing relevant features. 
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The most important thing to do for that end is to get rid of a ‘natural’ 
temporal order, retaining homeomorphically other relevant structures, 
on the one hand, and ‘knowing’ it – by observational or experiential 
knowledge – ‘in eternity’, on the other hand. Whether this temporal 
order is ‘knowable’ by knowledge conceived of under the paradigm 
of observational or experiential knowledge makes the difference of 
‘knowing’ a ‘temporal’ stochastically lawlike going on or a going on ‘in 
time’ due to acting by deliberation.
The formal background of the pictures to follow is the so called 
Alexandroff-Compactifaction. The simplest example thereof, and this is 
enough for the present model, is that the reals or open intervals thereof 
are homeomorphic to the circle, omitting the north-pole, say. The mutatis 
mutandis same holds for the ‘lines’ depicted in the preceding section.
Depicted homeomorphically on a (here) ‘leaf ’, the whole history due 
to agency and deliberation comes as a flower:
Figure 4
each leaf of that flower is the situation of one phase of the history. 
lines depicted boldly are the actualized possibilities, whereas the light 
lines are the possibilities not acted for. God ‘observes’ the difference 
of possibilities and actualities. but ‘observing’ is not enough to get the 
whole history, there is no natural ‘temporal’ order to be seen. What is the 
historically first phase? The left leaf? The right leaf? The leaf ahead? Due 
to the presence of different possibilities, inferential knowledge does not 
help either.
Figure 4
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The stochastically lawlike situation, however, presents itself differently:
Figure 5
Here, only one leaf is observed – this is due to lawlikeness; the story 
does not start a new at each phase. but an order may be discerned: As 
before, there is a difference between possibilities and realizations (these 
are depicted boldly), but the branchings follow from right to left (anti-
clockwise), may they be possible or realized. by inferential knowledge of 
the stochastic laws, it follows that the number of branchings increases as 
time goes on. And so, by a combination of observational and inferential 
knowledge, the history is ‘known’ as it proceeds in temporal order.
Going back to the case of agency: by ‘inferential knowledge’ it is 
known that there are four phases and that in each phase one and only 
one possibility is actualized. Combining this with the observational 
knowledge of what is actualized, the flower above becomes a bouquet:
Figure 6
This, however, gives no temporal order. To ‘know’ the temporal order, 
experiential knowledge must enter the scene. Due to His omniscience, 
Figu e 5
6
Figure 6
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also with respect to His experiential knowledge, God’s experiential 
knowledge of each of the individual’s experiences includes in full 
transparency the experiential past of the individual’s experience, may 
it consciously enter the individual’s experience or not. With this, one 
arrives at the bouquet to follow and to a temporal order, just count the 
leaves with bold lines in each flower:
Figure 7
VI. FINAllY, Some SPeCulATIoN
As a side-effect, to demonstrate that agent-causation – associated with 
‘experience’ – does make a difference not only for ‘temporal’ propagation 
on behalf of created individuals, but also for God’s ‘eternal’ knowledge, 
a model of how to conceive of the relation of ‘temporality’ and ‘eternity’ 
was presented. As far as the model goes, it shows that both intuitions 
may be combined coherently. This has consequences not only for agent-
causation and God’s omniscience, but also for His ‘relation to His creation’.
even if accepting the model of agent-causation and the difference 
agency makes with respect to ‘temporal propagation’ and an individual`s 
experience on the one side and God’s different ways of being a-temporally 
omniscient about all this, some philosophers may be inclined to question 
whether the acts of the individuals, structurally and psychically different 
as they may be from pure performance, are up to them. In the end, by His 
unrestricted power, it is God Himself who – by the very act of creation – 
brings about the acts of the created individuals.
A very extreme case of this intuition is leibniz’ theory of the created 
world as the best of all possible worlds. ‘before’ creating, God ‘decides’ 
Figure 7
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which one of the possible worlds He should create. And so, He is 
omniscient with respect to all possible worlds. This omniscience is not 
restricted to any ‘ontological’ detail of the possible worlds, it extends 
to their respective degrees of ‘perfection’ and ‘goodness’. God’s perfect 
knowledge of all these aspects, together with His goodness, ensues in 
the creation of the (unique!) best of all possible worlds, as leibniz puts it 
in his Dialogus: ‘Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet fit mundus’ 
(see the present tense!).
In this – as it seems – the world depends in any of its aspects, its 
performance, as in its sheer existence on God, on His power. Created, 
due to God’s exerting His power – His act – it is extremely one-sided 
dependent on God, whereas God does not ‘depend’ in any respect on his 
creation as created.
Further, tacitly assuming that ‘creation’ as an exteriorizing of sorts, 
leads to transcendence driven to its extreme. This has as consequence 
that God is, what may be called ‘metaphysically indifferent’ – leaving 
‘moral indifference’ aside – with respect to the created world as being 
thus ‘exteriorized’.
If, however, metaphysical indifference should be blocked – on 
whatever reasons – while retaining strict immutability and eternity, one 
may be driven to conceive of the created world, of any of its aspects, its 
performance, as its sheer existence as being ‘encapsulated’ ‘eternally’ in 
God. This is panentheism of sorts.
With respect to both versions – extreme transcendence and pantheism 
of sorts – the created world, any of its aspects, its performance, its ‘history’ 
is without any remainder, due to His act, and so there is no freedom 
for relevant individuals, there is no place for human freedom, neither 
with respect to extreme transcendence nor with respect to a panentheist 
framework of sorts.
These consequences, if correct, may be overcome. To this end, some 
intuitions about the ‘world’ must be revised and some metaphysical 
speculation may be allowed: The ‘world’ is not only a ‘net of actualities’ but 
it is also a ‘net of possibilities’, better: ‘potentialities’. These ‘potentialities’ 
are to be conceived of as ‘real’ or ‘ontological’ or ‘existing’. of course, 
their way of ‘being real’ or ‘ontological’ or ‘existing’ is different from the 
way actualities are ‘real’ or ‘ontological’ or ‘existing’. Within this world, 
individuals are – among other things – coordinated ‘bundles’ of their 
respective ‘potentialities’. During their life-time, individuals actualize 
their ‘potentialities’, leading to a  unique actual individual history. For 
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this, individuals are not only ‘bundles’ of potentialities, they must have, 
among other things, (as e.g. intellect) what may be called ‘power’, better, 
following leibniz: vis activa, to actualize at all. one history and only one 
history among different potential histories is actualized that way – of 
course within the framework of their individual potentialities as well as 
within the framework of the potentialities that co-constitute the embedding 
‘world’. by this, relevant individuals contribute to the actualization of 
a ‘world history’.
With respect to God’s creating the world, one must admit that God 
creates the framework or ‘net’ of potentialities. by this, He creates – as 
substructures – also relevant individuals as coordinated, coherently 
embedded ‘bundles’ of potentialities. This is not enough: The vis activa, 
the power to actualize at all, each relevant individual must have, is also 
(among other things) due to His creating.
This makes, with respect to what is actualized, relevant creatures 
‘creative’ in a  strong sense – but only within the framework created by 
Him and due to their ‘given’ vis activa.
That means, on behalf of God’s knowledge of actualities, that He can 
know of them only if they are actualized – and that is due to the creative 
relevant individuals, exercising their power. but, by being a-temporal 
and, not least, by His ‘experiential knowledge’, God’s omniscience is 
preserved unrestrictedly.
The sparse models of the article just wanted to hint at the coherence 
of God’s omniscience with respect to freedom, that is with respect to 
actualization within the framework of potentialities created by God, 
strictly due to creatures-within-the-framework-created-by-God. As 
hinted at above, this attempt is in need of refinement and in need of an 
embedding and elaborated metaphysical theory, whose core ought to be 
a ‘theory of creation’. And so, some tasks are left – tasks worth pursuing.6
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